Shadow Government

Obama's Cuba Problem

The last time President Obama met with his Latin American and Caribbean counterparts was not a particularly memorable affair.  The 2012 Summit of the Americas in Cartagena, Colombia, was overshadowed by an embarrassing Secret Service scandal that saw members of his advance team soaking in a little bit too much of the historical city's Caribbean nightlife.

Meanwhile, in the absence of any substantive agenda, President Obama spent most of the summit being hectored by his counterparts with the incongruous assertion that undemocratic outlier Cuba must be part of the next meeting of all the popularly elected governments in the Americas.

It was clear the president wasn't pleased with the badgering, complaining that, "Sometimes I feel as if in some of these discussions ... we're caught in a time warp, going back to the 1950s and gunboat diplomacy." 

Fast forward two years: Preparations for the 2015 Summit are well underway and once again Cuba's participation has become the flashpoint.  Governments in Argentina, Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Nicaragua have already said they will boycott any summit where Cuba is excluded.  Panama, the host, has announced its intention to formally invite Cuba, with its president saying that the presence of the last military dictatorship in the region was "important."

The State Department has already voiced its opposition, citing the 2001 Summit's agreed-upon "democracy clause," which conditions Summit participation to countries that respect democracy and rule of law.  According to a spokesperson, "So we should not undermine commitments previously made, but should instead encourage -- and this is certainly our effort -- the democratic changes necessary for Cuba to meet the basic qualifications." 

Secretary of State John Kerry privately repeated that message in no uncertain terms to Panamanian Vice President Isabel de Saint Malo when the two met at the beginning of September.

Nevertheless, the drumbeat has started that President Obama must accept the Castro regime's presence at the Summit or else, as one former advisor to President Clinton has said, be "responsible for the collapse of inter-American summitry, 20 years after its initiation by President Clinton."

There is no doubt that U.S.-Cuba policy critics see the president's dilemma as a golden opportunity to mainstream Cuba back into regional polite society despite its uncompromising, repressive rule, thus making it more difficult to justify the U.S. policy of isolating the Castro regime politically and economically.  The administration will therefore be coming under enormous pressure to accept the "inevitable" and attend the Summit with Cuba. 

These critics understand the power that symbolism plays in international affairs.  The presence of a U.S. President at any event -- international or otherwise -- is never routine, or ever lacking of import and consequence.  Thus, in their construction, President Obama's attendance at a Summit with Cuba will signal a U.S. surrender of fifty years of its embargo-centric policy.  On the other hand, the symbolic importance of standing up for the region's hard-won democratic gains over the past quarter-century by making a point about the incongruity of Cuba's presence in this age of regional democracy will be a dagger in their heart.

It's worth noting that several of the governments insisting on Cuba's presence are those guilty of their own back-sliding on respect for democratic institutions over the last several years, including Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador.  Why wouldn't they want the Castro regime present in regional fora, so as to lower the bar for everyone on adhering to democratic principles?

But this isn't just to argue that President Obama should just stiff his counterparts and appoint a lesser State Department official to attend in his stead if other Latin American governments insist on Cuba's presence.  The president should seize the opportunity to be proactive and make a statement that what distinguishes the Americas is that it is a community of democracies and that commitments to democratic governance are enduring and meaningful to ensure it will always be that way.  He should challenge others to argue why the Castros' military dictatorship is deserving of any special consideration or compromise for their flaunting of democratic norms over the past five decades. 

If, in the end, the president opts not to attend the Summit due to the Castro regime's presence, meaning that the U.S. "isolates" itself from the Summit process, then so be it.  Principle is more important that popularity.  The sun will rise the next day and the struggle for democracy in Cuba will continue.  And if Latin American governments choose to condition their relationships with Washington on U.S. relations with Cuba, that is their choice to make -- and to live with.

YAMIL LAGE/AFP/Getty Images

Shadow Government

The Real Obama “Pivot”: Back to the Middle East

As Oval Office addresses on national security go, President Obama's remarks Wednesday night were pretty sound. He identified the enemy as the Islamic State, stated a goal to "degrade and ultimately destroy" it, and described four components of that campaign. But taken in the context of his serious and serial mishandling of foreign policy over the last six years, the president's speech also struck an oddly discordant note, one that throws into sharp relief just how much the tenets of his speech contrasted with his previous policies. In short, this speech represents the real Obama's "pivot" -- not to Asia, but back to the Middle East.

After years of bragging about "ending the war in Iraq," Obama is now escalating a new war in Iraq. After years of refusing to support the Syrian rebel opposition, Obama now announces not only that he will support the rebels but that doing so will be one of the cornerstones of his IS campaign. After years of claiming that the al Qaeda threat is sharply diminished, Obama now claims that the threat from an al Qaeda spinoff (IS) is so serious that it merits a new war -- a war, moreover, that he strongly hints will be conducted under the legal authority of the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force in Afghanistan against the Taliban and al Qaeda. After years of insisting that any use of force needs formal legitimation by a multilateral institution, Obama now prepares to go to war with a coalition of the willing of just nine countries -- but without U.N. Security Council authorization, without the formal endorsement of any other multilateral organization such as NATO or the Arab League, and even without explicit authorization from the U.S. Congress. And after years of believing that reducing the American presence and leadership abroad is necessary to get other nations to step up and take ownership, President Obama now asserts that "This is American leadership at its best: We stand with people who fight for their own freedom, and we rally other nations on behalf of our common security and common humanity."

I do not list the preceding shifts to play a cheap game of "gotcha" -- I am cautiously supportive of these new policies, certainly as improvements on the old ones. But I do want to highlight a more serious set of questions: in announcing this new phase of war, has President Obama substantially changed his mind on all of the above? Is his new strategy one that he believes in deeply, or one that he will continue to debate and question?

It was telling that the two examples President Obama (inaccurately) cited as precedent were Yemen and Somalia, when the most similar intervention would in fact be Libya, where an American-led coalition undertook months of airstrikes in support of Libyan rebel ground forces to defeat the Qaddafi regime and end its control of Libyan territory. Likewise the new IS strategy as announced tonight will consist of an American-led coalition engaging in prolonged airstrikes in support of Iraqi, Kurdish, and Syrian rebel ground forces to defeat the Islamic State and end its control of its territory. It is not clear why the president did not cite the Libya precedent, but it may be because he now realizes that in light of Libya's ongoing meltdown, he got many things wrong about Libya. His most significant mistake was believing that regime change could be done only with airstrikes and local forces, while failing to develop a robust post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction policy.  

It is often forgotten today, but in President Jimmy Carter's last year in office he developed an assertive policy towards the Soviet Union including a major defense buildup, support for rebels fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan, and suspending any further arms control agreements. Carter adopted these policies after the many traumas of 1979, culminating in the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, made him realize that the previous three years of his Cold War policies had been naïve and weak. Six years into his presidency, perhaps President Obama has now arrived at a similar "Carter moment" and realizes that with just over two years left in his administration, he needs to make a similar shift.

SAFIN HAMED/AFP/Getty Images